MEDIA EMPIRES: CORPORATE POWER AND RESISTANCE

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This article examines the challenges faced by Beijing in managing this increasingly complex relationship, reflecting upon the structural factors that encourage harmony and introduce discord in China–Africa ties. It examines how various policy solutions being considered by China, ranging from increasing participants in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes, may still not address the most difficult issues involving adverse reactions to the Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition groups. In particular the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/investor states. The article concludes by asking how the Chinese system can make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing models and practices of the developed countries.


Although information technology is playing a fundamental role in China’s political development, relatively little is known about the contours of online participation in government policymaking. This article presents the results of a survey of individuals who, in 2008, used the Internet to submit comments on the central government’s plan to reform the nation’s health system. The responses demonstrate that participants were, in the aggregate, well-educated professionals who live in urban areas and were especially likely to work in the medical and health industry. Substantial numbers of participants commented as a means of expressing concerns about the overall direction of reform, as well as on specific elements of the proposal itself. Participants generally anticipated no more than a modest degree of government responsiveness, although high expectations were held for comments from government officials and individuals who worked in the medical and health industry. Overall, these attributes and attitudes are illustrative of the evolution, as opposed to transformation, of the political system that is occurring in online contexts where neither democratization nor the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party is of immediate salience to government officials and societal stakeholders.

Offshore R & D by multinational corporations (MNCs) has increasingly involved the developing world in East Asia, initially Taiwan and Korea but more recently China and India. However, the R & D mandates of foreign R & D facilities in this region tend not to follow the paths of evolutionary models. To explain this phenomenon, this article presents a conceptual framework, essentially based on Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, with a strong flavor of the evolutionary approach to technology, but which, in some cases, also allows for leapfrogging competition. In terms of empirical work, the article also explores the relationship between MNCs’ overseas R & D mandates and the locational advantage of the host country by conducting case studies on flagship MNCs’ R & D facilities in the information technology sector on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The results show some interesting contrasts across the Taiwan Strait that run counter to the evolutionary perspective. There are grounds to suggest that such contrasts have much to do with the locational advantages Taiwan and China each possess. Further implications are drawn to enrich the current understanding of R & D internationalization.


This paper investigates the motives of internationalization of two leading Chinese multinational corporations, their entry strategy and strategic responses to overcome internationalization barriers. In particular, we explore the political strategy and the corresponding political behaviour these two firms adopt to facilitate their internationalization process. We also examine the business strategy and human resource strategy they deploy in their internationalization endeavour and what impacts these may have on host country development, including human capital development and employment creation.


In China as elsewhere, netizens have made new demands upon government and challenged conventional media to respond to popular concerns. Established approaches to controlling the media may be otiose; Party leaders are stressing the value of cooperation rather than confrontation and calling for a new relationship between media and authority. This article examines how the department of a city government traditionally tasked with controlling the media and shaping opinion is seeking to come to terms with the calls from the centre and, in the process, think up a different kind of relationship with the media. From dealings with press officers over four years, the authors identify a reflective and dynamic response to the present challenges. The respondents speculate that arrangements being put in place to deal with the new media environment may change fundamentally the relationships between authority and citizen, and the authors evaluate this.


The popularization of digital media technologies in the People’s Republic of China has led to the liberalization of public discourse and provided the citizenry with new opportunities for political
advocacy. This article employs content analysis of newspapers and blogs to test information regime theory and finds considerable evidence of a transformation in the properties of political communication. Chinese Communist Party-led institutions, however, have responded to new challenges with legal and technological measures designed to control and guide political expression. The authors consider evidence that suggests new media have empowered China’s “netizens” and diminished the state’s ability to set the public agenda and shape political preferences.


Through case studies of Huawei and ZTE, this paper finds that Chinese telecom firms have followed the general pathway of technological learning of latecomers, that is: they first developed mature foreign technologies; then moved on to higher level technologies in the consolidation stage in advanced countries; and finally progressed from imitation to innovation, generating emerging technologies in mobile communication and data-network fields. The study demonstrates that (1) latecomers caught up successfully by building innovation capability from the beginning, and (2) collaboration with established partners only came later when they had higher level innovation capability. In addition, R&D globalization was an important technological strategy for Huawei and ZTE. The order and pace of development indicate that their R&D globalization strategy is to tap into global resources and markets that would otherwise be unavailable to latecomers. At the beginning of catching-up, unlike Korean firms in the auto, electronics, and semiconductor industries who developed mature foreign technologies by relying on technology transfer from foreign sources, Chinese telecom firms conducted in-house R&D on switch technology, because of the high cost and unavailability of the technology, their lack of understanding of foreign markets and technology, and foreign firms’ interest in China’s market. Further, operating in a more dynamic technological regime and a much more integrated global economic environment, Chinese firms were able to adopt some global technology strategies such as joint collaboration, participating in industrial standards organizations, and R&D globalization at a much earlier stage of their catching up than had the Korean firms, mainly to compensate for their limited initial access to global resources.


Faced with the world’s largest Internet population, the Chinese government is torn between its massive drive for marketization and the need to curb cyber dissent. This paper investigates how the Chinese state censors the Internet by tracing the trajectory of mechanisms to block websites non grata. Results show that Chinese government’s Internet control methods are diverse with systematic collaborations from local authorities at various administrative levels. We also found evidence that the government has customized blocking strategies for what it considers to be important websites. The efficacy and implications of China’s Internet censorship system were also discussed.

The Chinese government has recently introduced a policy requiring all large Chinese business corporations to transform their corporate cultures with the aim of increasing their competitiveness on the international stage. This paper traces the origins of the policy to the outstanding performance of a small number of Chinese firms since the late 1980s, a phenomenon attributed by the CEOs of these firms to effective implementation of cultural values change among their workforces. We give detailed accounts of two such firms, Haier Group and Huawei Technologies, demonstrating how they have utilized cultural management techniques to improve their employees’ performance. We also identify some negative aspects of their approach to cultural management that may impede these firms in their efforts to become truly international corporations.


In the aftermath of China’s ICT-driven and mass-mediated neoliberal development, the need to reduce China’s economic vulnerability to transnational market volatility and to pacify class tensions by improving social justice and redistributing social resources has become urgent. The “socialist harmonious society” concept marks a more sophisticated and socially-oriented mode of governance. By examining two state projects under the auspices of constructing a socialist harmonious society, i.e., the state-endorsed surge of charity activities and the state-subsidized increase of vocational education targeting exclusively rural migrants, this paper argues that these emerging sites of governance, often responding to and defined by China’s ICT-driven and mass-mediated neoliberal development, mark the neoliberal restructuring of state activities, and that what distinguishes this new mode of governance is the neoliberal notion of redistribution, which is central to the quasi-inclusive social institutions discussed in this paper.


This paper provides a historical overview of China’s telecom development since market reform. Using Sichuan and Guangdong Provinces for comparison, the paper delineates two stages of telecom reform and explores how telecom networks foster domestic regional and social inequalities within the general process of development.


Internet service providers (ISPs) have played an important role in China’s internet regulation regime. This article illustrates how ISPs are governed to serve the government’s regulatory goals. This involves examining some of the most extraordinary and profound insights concerning internet governance: the theories of the layers principle, the end-to-end argument and the generative internet. Chinese ISPs have been dependent rather than neutral regulatory
intermediaries of the government. Moreover, in addition to telecommunication carriers, the radio and television networks affiliated to the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) are to become a new type of ISP that is capable of choking the free spirit of the internet, as recently demonstrated by the far-reaching policy of “network convergence.” This article argues that the policy has the potential to drastically alter the structure and ecology of the internet in China.


With over 500 million Internet users and 900 million mobile-phone subscribers by mid 2011, the Chinese Internet is an enormous market that has produced the spectacular rise of many Chinese Internet companies and attracted substantial foreign investment. This paper argues that, despite a great degree of liberalization of its market over the past 15 years, the Chinese Internet remains authoritarian in nature. Not only did the central government actively shape the infrastructure and rules of China’s information superhighways, but recently it has also vigorously built state-controlled Internet companies, including a national search engine.

The paper starts with an overview of the landscape of the Chinese Internet industry, followed by a review of the developmental trajectories of three important search companies in China – Baidu, Google, and Jike (the national search engine), whose stories are illustrative of the experiences of domestic, foreign and state Internet firms operating in China. The paper then outlines the Chinese government’s regulatory policies towards the Internet industry, which it is argued have undergone three stages: liberalization, regulation, and state capitalism.

It is recognized that the great prospect of the Chinese Internet is shadowed by, and often overshadowed by, the government’s insistence on weaving a China Wide Web. Domestic and foreign Internet companies are invariably used, or restricted, for social control as the government painstakingly transplants its ideology into cyberspace. Such practice is not only morally degrading but also unsustainable in the long run. An assessment of Chinese government policy toward Internet firms operating in China is not merely an academic exercise; it raises ethical and policy concerns for foreign governments, international organizations, and investor communities in China’s expanding Internet market.


We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be
censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.


China has lived with the Internet for nearly two decades. Will increased Internet use, with new possibilities to share information and discuss news and politics, lead to democracy, or will it to the contrary sustain a nationalist supported authoritarianism that may eventually contest the global information order?

This book takes stock of the ongoing tug of war between state power and civil society on and off the Internet, a phenomenon that is fast becoming the centerpiece in the Chinese Communist Party’s struggle to stay in power indefinitely. It interrogates the dynamics of this enduring contestation, before democracy, by following how Chinese society travels from getting access to the Internet to our time having the world’s largest Internet population. Pursuing the rationale of Internet regulation, the rise of the Chinese blogosphere and citizen journalism, Internet irony, online propaganda, the relation between state and popular nationalism, and finally the role of social media to bring about China’s democratization, this book offers a fresh and provocative perspective on the arguable role of media technologies in the process of democratization, by applying social norm theory to illuminate the competition between the Party-state norm and the youth/subaltern norm in Chinese media and society.


Using the October 2008 slapping incident of historian Yan Chongnian as a case study, this article attempts to contextualize and critically examine the articulation of Han supremacism on the Chinese internet. It demonstrates how an informal group of non-elite, urban youth are mobilizing the ancient Han ethnonym to challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s official policy of multiculturalism, while seeking to promote pride and self-identification with the Han race (han minzu) to the exclusion of the non-Han minorities. In contrast to most of the Anglophone literature on Chinese nationalism, this article seeks to employ “Han” as a ”boundary-spanner,” a category that turns our analysis of Chinese national identity formation on its head, side-stepping the “usual suspects” (intellectuals, dissidents and the state itself) and the prominent role of the “foreign other” in Chinese ethnogenesis, and instead probing the unstable plurality of the self/othering process in modern China and the role of the internet in opening up new spaces for non-mainstream identity articulation.

Drawing on recent survey data, digital ethnography and comparative analysis, this article presents a critical re-appraisal of the interactive blogosphere in China and its effects on Chinese social and political life. Focused on the discursive and behaviorist trends of Chinese netizens rather than the ubiquitous information control/resistance paradigm, it argues that the Sinophone blogosphere is producing the same shallow infotainment, pernicious misinformation, and interest-based ghettos that it creates elsewhere in the world, and these more prosaic elements need to be considered alongside the Chinese internet’s potential for creating new forms of civic activism and socio-political change.


It can be postulated that the all of the four major agencies in the field of Chinese Internet, the state, the market consisting of the ISP, ICP, the social elite, and the folk society, are deeply engaged in a process of creating a national cyberspace. The Party-state, who exercises the strongest influence over the shaping of the Chinese web and the public ethos, seeks to control the dissemination of political disputes, and to maintain a unified, stabilized nation. Rather than to have a monopoly of information in China, the regime’s ambition seems lesser but more decisive: the containment of the vibrant civil society. It encourages, from time to time, the development of the Internet in China. The market, or the proprietors of websites and dotcoms and owners of IT companies, once were committed to establishing a E-civil culture of the Chinese people, but later have to come to terms with the governmental constraints so as to stay in business. The social elites, once were overtly promoting e-democracy in China, now either withdraw to smaller and safer online venues, or collaborate with the market to create dose that could gratify the populace’s need for entertainment. The folk society, the central figure of the Chinese web, once demonstrated the aspiration for civic virtue as well as the capacity to organize democratic practices and to generate deliberative discussions, now is preoccupied with a crave for mindparalyzing fun time. Alongside the prevalence of trivial gossips, a popular nationalism seems to be the predominant bond that connects the individual to the public and the national.


In recent years, Chinese netizens have shown they possess boundless creativity and ingenuity in finding ways to express themselves despite government restrictions on online speech. To Chinese Internet users, those terms often resonate deeply by expressing feelings about shared experiences that millions of people can immediately relate to. Does New Language Lead to New Thought? Will new political discourse give birth to a new political identity? Are new forms of networked communication enhancing opportunities for social change and helping to move China toward a “threshold” for political transformation? This study is attempting to shed lights on those questions.

This paper is a comparative analysis of the telecommunications policy-making process in China and India. Adopting an institutionalist perspective and multi-streams frame-work, the paper analyzes the formal structures, rule-making procedures and interest groups involved in telecommunications policy-making in the two countries, in terms of their evolution over the last two decades. Though the two systems began this period with a somewhat similar ministerial-bureaucratic decision-making model, and faced similar problems of assimilating new interest groups and responding to international pressures, the paper finds that the decision systems in the two countries evolved in significantly different directions. China’s telecommunications decision-making is significantly affected by the macro level political rearrangement and is more likely to be non-incremental. On the other hand, confronted by an increasingly litigious environment and a more fractious interest group culture, India represents a somewhat classical textbook case of incremental policy making. Nevertheless, numerous challenges remain in both countries, including institutional capacity and excessive regulatory deference to political authority.


Given that both youth and the Internet hold the potential to inflict, or at least contribute to, far-reaching social change, it is important to address this knowledge gap by systematically investigating how youth are interacting with the Internet in a Chinese context. This is the rationale behind this book. It will explore how urban youth, members of the only-child generation, appropriate the Internet in negotiating meaning making within the socio-cultural context of a Chinese society experiencing spectacular transformation. My investigation will be organized around two general themes: young people’s perceptions and experiences of the Internet and their online self-representation. In so doing, it is hoped that this book will contribute to the world’s understanding of Chinese society by shedding light on what it means to be Chinese today and how ‘modern’ ‘Chineseness’ may be (re)constructed in the Internet age.

The empirical findings presented in this book are an outcome of a three year project on urban youth and the Internet in China. The primary aim is to obtain an in-depth understanding of urban youth’s perceptions and experiences of the Internet and their online self-representation. Data collection was organized around four major topics: urban youth’s I-and-the-Internet narratives; urban youth and the Net café, ‘wangba’ in Chinese; youth’s online community building; and youth’s negotiation of a political self using the Internet.


While increased attention has been paid to the rise of Chinese environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), the role that new information and communication technologies (ICTs) play in these ENGOs’ collective actions has rarely been investigated. Based on first-hand information gained from field research with 19 environmental NGOs in Beijing, the author identified 18 Internet-based environmental collective actions and illustrated the specific conditions under which Chinese ENGOs employ the Internet to engage in these actions. Specifically, this study developed an analytical typology of ICT for the environmental movement to examine the extent to
which and conditions under which Chinese ENGOs employ ICTs, especially the Internet, for chances of mobilization and social change. From six groups of thematically classified cases, the study also uniquely compared how various web conditions combine with and mediate various structural dimensions of the campaigns to achieve a certain level of social change.


This chapter presents a case study of the African CSR discourse of Huawei Technologies, a leading Chinese telecommunication company, within the broader context of China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Our analysis of Huawei’s Web site, CSR reports, annual reports, employee newspapers and blogs, and news reports shows that Huawei promotes a development model of CSR, which is consistent with China’s model of development. Huawei’s business model in Africa, however, can potentially backfire on China’s public diplomacy efforts on the African continent.

As the author analyses, Africans hold positive view towards globalization. In this context, Chinese companies’ developmental model of CSR may strike a chord with African stakeholders. So does China’s developmental approach in its diplomacy efforts in Africa. However, African stakeholders are also sensitive toward foreign companies’ practices. Many believe that rich countries benefit more from such a trend and that they are not playing fair. Although Chinese companies can potentially play a major role in China’s diplomacy in Africa, if they fail to address issues such as working conditions, localization, and business transparency, their practices might backfire and even dampen the Sino-African relationship that the Chinese government has worked so hard to build.


While social networking platforms can be powerful tools in the hands of activists seeking to bring down authoritarian governments, it is unwise to assume that access to the Internet and social networking platforms alone is sufficient for democratization of repressive regimes. The case of China demonstrates how authoritarian regimes can adapt to the Internet, even using networked technologies to bolster legitimacy. The emergence of Chinese “networked authoritarianism” highlights difficult issues of policy and corporate responsibility that must be resolved in order to ensure that the Internet and mobile technologies can fulfill their potential to support liberation and empowerment.


The explosive growth in India’s mobile telephony during the last decade coincided with a robust growth in its trade with China. A variety of imported equipment from China played a critical role in augmenting the use of mobile phones and expansion of networks in India. This paper studies the trends of these imports and examines the reasons for their penetrating deep into the Indian market. It argues that Chinese imports bridged a serious supply-side deficiency in India’s
telecom sector: the absence of a modern indigenous equipment manufacturing industry. Pointing out that development of the latter has been stunted due to low R&D, limited innovations, lack of access to finance, and liberal access to imports, the paper argues that Chinese imports are likely to continue until these conditions prevail, notwithstanding security concerns over such imports.


This study examines online collective action concerning grievances of farmers whose land was expropriated by the Chinese government for economic development. Such actions have resulted in numerous conflicts between officials and farmers who fear losing their sole survival source without adequate compensation. The authors examine two cases of such grievances: the Wang Shuai and Wu Baoquan Incidents. These cases were initiated by aggrieved ‘netizens’ and reinforced by the news media through the Internet. Data include online material from a sample of seven Chinese websites discussing the cases. Using perspectives on framing and its connection to online activism, the authors examine how protest on behalf of initiators and varied support from the media produced different outcomes. Concise framing and continuous media attention are essential to mobilizing support for successful collective action. These techniques and new technologies are part of an expanding trend in grassroots activism in China.


The idea of the “digital divide,” the great social division between information have-s and have-nots, has dominated policy debates and scholarly analysis since the 1990s. In Working-Class Network Society, Jack Linchuan Qiu describes a more complex social and technological reality in a newly mobile, urbanizing China. Qiu argues that as inexpensive Internet and mobile phone services become available and are closely integrated with the everyday work and life of low-income communities, they provide a critical seedbed for the emergence of a new working class of “network labor” crucial to China’s economic boom. Between the haves and have-nots, writes Qiu, are the information “have-less”: migrants, laid-off workers, micro-entrepreneurs, retirees, youth, and others, increasingly connected by cybercafés, prepaid service, and used mobile phones. A process of class formation has begun that has important implications for working-class network society in China and beyond. Qiu brings class back into the scholarly discussion, not as a secondary factor but as an essential dimension in our understanding of communication technology as it is shaped in the vast, industrializing society of China. Basing his analysis on his more than five years of empirical research conducted in twenty cities, Qiu examines technology and class, networked connectivity and public policy, in the context of massive urban reforms that affect the new working class disproportionately. The transformation of Chinese society, writes Qiu, is emblematic of the new technosocial reality emerging in much of the Global South.


This paper offers a preliminary analysis of Chinese non-elite knowledge workers, their use of information technologies as tools of employment as well as worker organisation, and the emergent process of network labour formation. It opens by presenting a conceptual framework
for understanding non-elite knowledge workers, their social contexts, types, and the interrelationships among these types, paying special attention to new types of digital work (call centres, SMS authoring, and online game gold farming), their process of emergence and patterns of spatial distribution. It then sketches out the main linkages between grassroots workers’ groups in mainland China and labour organisations outside showing that, even though bottom-up transnational labour organisation is still quite limited at the present stage, informal networking through new digital tools is full of potential. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for a new informational politics.


All post-9/11 Olympic Games and sport mega events deploy super-surveillance systems, as a future security investment, albeit at the expense of rights and freedoms. This paper compares the Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games’ surveillance systems, to assess their authoritarian effects and legacies in democratic and authoritarian Olympic host regimes. In democratic Greece, memories of the dictatorship have caused reaction and resistance to the perpetuation of the Olympic surveillance systems. In China, the police state has used these systems for Olympic and regime security, reinforcing population and Internet control. Drawing on these two cases, it is demonstrated that post-9/11 Olympic security and surveillance have authoritarian effects, which are dependent on global factors like anti-terrorist and neo-liberal policies, and local factors such as the type of host regime, culture and society. It is also argued that these surveillance systems have an emerging anti-democratic legacy which stretches beyond the hosting of the Olympics.


In recent years, the governments of China and India have initiated a strategic partnership. Talks of creating an integrated “Chindia” economic hub have been commonplace. Many studies have been undertaken from conflicting perspectives on bilateral relations at the high level, but how ordinary Chinese people view their contemporary Indian counterparts and how this provides a civic dimension to the partnership remains underexplored. In an authoritarian nation where exhibiting sentiments contrary to the party-state’s policy is not encouraged and remains uncommon, the Chinese have increasingly relied upon the internet to express their views on various aspects of policy, including that towards India. Using systematic, qualitative research on the online community, this article categorizes the various opinions expressed by Chinese internet users about India, the Indians and Beijing’s Indian policy; analyses the apparent huge gap between these perceptions and the official rhetoric of Beijing; and forecasts how such perceptions might influence future Sino-Indian relations.

Since the Chinese were officially plugged into the virtual community in 1994, the usage of the internet in the country has developed at an incredible rate. By the end of 2008, there were approximately 298 million netizens in China, a number which surpasses that of the U.S. and ranks China the highest user in the world. The rapid development of the online Chinese community has not only boosted the information flow among citizens across the territory, but has also created a new form of social interaction between the state, the media, various professionals and intellectuals, as well as China’s ordinary citizens. Although the subject of this book is online Chinese nationalism, which to a certain extent is seen as a pro-regime phenomenon, the emergence of an online civil society in China intrinsically provides some form of supervision of state power-perhaps even a check on it. The fact that the party-state has made use of this social interaction, while at the same time remaining worried about the negative impact of the same netizens, is a fundamental characteristic of the nature of the relationship between the state and the internet community.

Many questions arise when considering the internet and Chinese nationalism. Which are the most important internet sites carrying online discussion of nationalism related to the author’s particular area of study? What are the differences between online nationalism and the conventional form of nationalism, and why do these differences exist? Has nationalist online expression influenced actual foreign policy making? Has nationalist online expression influenced discourse in the mainstream mass media in China? Have there been any counter reactions towards online nationalism? Where do they come from? Online Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations seeks to address these questions.


The past three decades have seen the resurgence of China’s civil society through the blossoming of NGOs that campaign for various marginalized interests, including environmental protection. Many studies have examined the co-evolution of the Internet and China’s civil society. This paper examines the role of the Internet in strengthening grassroots environmental activism, taking into consideration the corporatised character of Chinese NGOs. Through a detailed ethnographic case study of a leading grassroots environmental group, the Global Village of Beijing (GVB), I argue that Internet technologies effectively empower resource-poor activists in their self-representation, information brokering, network building, public mobilisation and construction of discourse communities. The Net therefore contributes to the nascent formation of a green public sphere in China by fostering a discourse that counterbalances rapid economic development. Also discussed here are issues that hamper this process, including resource limitations, the fragmentation of online discourse communities, and the marginalisation and “caging” of environmental discourse.


This commentary surveys the development of microblogging in China and discusses how the unusual characteristics of the Chinese internet have given rise to a highly politicized Twitter community alongside a vibrant but constrained domestic microblogging scene.
Twitter has become one of the rubrics through which cyber-utopians and realists have debated the political effects of the internet. Despite research findings that show that internet use and effects tend to be context-specific rather than universal (Lee, 2009), microblogging is frequently reduced to Twitter and some commentators appear untroubled in transposing their arguments from one context to another. Yet, as the case of microblogging in China outlined in this commentary demonstrates, different media and tools take on different forms according to the social and political contexts in which they are adopted. In China, the strong regulatory environment and growth of mainstream alternatives ready to accept required censorship, has resulted in a highly unusual microblogging environment. Although Twitter is blocked, its being banned has made it a much freer space than the mainstream services that have adopted strong self-censorship regimes. Twitter has become a subversive space and tweeting a consciously political decision, attracting a congregation of like-minded activists, bloggers, lawyers and other people critical of the state (or sympathetic to such claims, including many western intellectuals). The sense of community and solidarity building is evident on Twitter, but it is restricted to this space, being literally and metaphorically cut off from the rest of Chinese cyberspace. By contrast, despite heavy self-censorship enforced by Sina Weibo, this mainstream platform has developed into a kind of tabloid press, raising scandals, mobilizing capricious online public opinion and in some cases effecting ‘virtual mob justice’. Their enormous numbers, the unusually social and active personality of Chinese netizens, and the mistrust of official information sources has helped Sina Weibo become a contested force in Chinese politics. Sina Weibo may be a ‘rambunctious sandbox’, but we must not forget that it comes with ‘walls and adult supervision’ (Epstein, 2011).


Social networks and the internet both have a substantial individual effect on environmental activism in China. In this article, we speculate that social linking patterns between environmental actors, which often facilitate activism on the ground, may also exist in cyberspace in the form of an online network. The article addresses the following empirical questions. Does such an online network exist? If so, who are the constituent actors? Are these the same actors observed on the ground? In addressing these questions the article aims to contribute to the growing debate on the implications of the internet for the potential emergence of social movements in China.


Although not frequently regarded as controversial, digital communications industries continue to be sites of CSR conflicts, particularly internationally. Investigating CSR issues in the digital communications industry is pertinent because in addition to being one of the fastest growing industries, it has created a host of new CSR issues that require further attention. This case study examines an incident in early 2010, when Google Inc. China and the Chinese government reached an impasse that produced a large-scale, transnational conflict that reached a head ostensibly over state-mandated censorship, ultimately prompting Google to withdraw from the mainland Chinese market and redirect its activities to Hong Kong. We track Google’s experience in China, both to explore its strategies and to consider the implications for corporate social responsibility. We situate Google’s drastic decision to withdraw entirely from mainland China in the complex
multiplicity of ethical, cultural, and political conflicts that affect this particular case. On a broader level, the incident raises the question of how multinational corporations (MNCs) can achieve corporate growth while negotiating the highly sensitive sociopolitical and institutional environments of foreign nations.


The internet is widely seen to have facilitated social movement organizations (SMOs) by providing them with alternative media. In the western context, some authors suggest that additionally SMOs use the internet tactically as a tool to gain access to traditional news media. This usage is seen to reaffirm and reinforce the centrality of print and electronic news media. This article shifts the focus to China and examines the interaction between the internet and the traditional mass media in the unfolding of three internet incidents. It reveals that via the expression of public opinion on the internet ordinary people are able to collectively shape and even direct conventional news agendas. In China, where the role of the media is to ‘direct’ public opinion rather than to reflect it, this suggests that the interaction between the two forms of communication serves to challenge state control over the traditional media.


Past studies on print and TV satire have revealed that satire can be seen as a site of resistance to power. In light of this, interesting questions can be raised regarding Internet satire: what does the Internet contribute to the resistance and what kind of power relation is played out on this site? Using an example from China, this paper reveals that like its print and TV counterparts, Internet satire reflects a widespread feeling of powerlessness, rather than offering the general public any political power. However, the Internet helps to push the symbolic power of satire to a higher level. This is because it makes satire a tool for the grassroots which facilitates the creation and spread of satirical ideas, and also helps to release and stimulate the enormous reserve of public wit and wisdom. As a result, satire on the Internet has the potential to generate a chain of related satirical work, which can create a satire movement and subject power to sustained shame and ridicule.


It is a common perception that as long as people have the resources to access the internet, they are in a position to make their voice heard. In reality, however, it is obvious that the vast majority of internet users are not really able to make themselves ‘visible’ and that their concerns receive little attention. Thus, it is more accurate to suggest that the internet offers ordinary people the potential of this power. Under what conditions can this potential be realized and what are the associated implications? Drawing upon the concept of symbolic power, and utilizing a recent example from China, this article addresses these often overlooked questions. It shows that it is not easy to materialize the potential of symbolic power on the internet. What the internet makes
easy is to produce follow-up discourse once a powerful symbol has appeared. With the aid of supporters and their follow-up discourses, the symbol creates a symbolic network and takes roots in the society quickly and deeply. Finally, some thoughts on symbolic power in the context of China are also provided in the framework of discourse and social change.


Our study examines the nature and development of microblogging in China. By adopting a Gramscian thesis of ‘hegemony’, we argue that the Chinese regime is facing a crisis of hegemony and the emergence of the microblogosphere has provided a platform for the war of position to establish counter-hegemony. The main features of microblogging in China are the emergence of opinion leaders, the close involvement of traditional media, and a more passive role of the state in the microblogosphere. The predominant liberal leaning of the microblogosphere has illustrated the emergence of counter-hegemony, where government connection is an instant negativity. The regime can exercise censorship but has lost ideational leadership.


This paper explores the uses of YouTube by Uyghur nationalist movement activists and studies various ideological codes used by different communities to promote their messages. It argues that several ideological codes are produced in order to challenge the dominant ideologies promoted by the Chinese government, which create a ground for Uyghur ‘imagined solidarity’ across physical borders. Analysis of the production of audio-visual messages by the dispersed ethnic group provides an important window into how ethnic identity is forged by means of Web 2.0.


This article examines the role and power of online media in representing an emerging culture of social activism and protests in both urban and rural China. It focuses on the discursive practices of China’s citizenry in utilising the global dimensions of online media within a localised and situated context, to reflect upon, construct and transform social practices with Chinese characteristics. This article utilises a cross-case method to compare and contrast online and mobile social activism in Shanghai, Xiamen, Tibet and Xinjiang. It examines these dynamics against the backdrop of an emerging Chinese middle class, which has been supported by the Chinese government’s economic reform as a way to build a more consumer-oriented, affluent and stable Chinese society. This analysis is framed within the extensive theoretical underpinnings of social theory and civil society, specifically the work of Pierre Bourdieu on capital accumulation and social differentiation. The article concludes that while the Chinese middle class may not be politically docile and can achieve social change, it does so based on self-interest while being mindful and wary of how its actions are perceived by authorities, thus managing protests carefully so the middle class can continue to reap the economic rewards of state capitalism.
Consequently, any move towards democratic structures facilitated through online and mobile communication will be slow and carefully managed in a way that benefits the government and the current power structure, especially when focusing on politically and socially sensitive issues such as sovereignty.


It is an edited volume published by In-media Hong Kong, which documents the developments of independent media in four societies in Asia, namely, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The China part is written by Wen Yunchao, a famous blogger in China. In it, Wen traces the development of independent media in China from underground publications prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The author then divided China’s media development in three phases, from 1978 to 1989, 1989 to 1998, and 1998 to the present. In the first phase, media workers enjoyed a golden age of journalism right after the end of Cultural Revolution. There was also a strong civil publication culture at that time. However, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident has put a halt to such phenomenon, with the Chinese government’s increasing efforts to control the media landscape. Yet the emergence and popularization of the Internet in the later 20th century has rejuvenated the civil publication culture online with the flourishing of blog, website, and online magazine, etc. In this light, the author argues that, despite the presence of harsh internet regulations and laws, Internet still presents a glimmer of hope for the future of Chinese independent media, when there is no sign that the government will relax its control on print and electronic media.


China has the world’s largest Internet market with over 400 million people online. Chinese government has established the world’s most extensive, sophisticated, and technologically advanced online censorship system. This article aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the Internet’s political impact by mapping out the dynamics of “domination and resistance” as well as citizen mobilization, and interpreting political discourse created by Chinese netizens. How are tech-savvy “information brokers” expanding free-information flow through the Great Firewall? What local issues generate online resonance and became national “internet events”? And what role are prominent bloggers playing in setting the national media agenda? This article also explains how online activism gradually undermines the values and ideology that reproduce compliance with the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian regime, and, as such, force an opening for free expression and civil society in China


China’s state-controlled and commercialised media and Internet ecology has inherent limitations in representing the interests of workers as industrial citizens. Drawing upon Western scholars’ theoretical critiques of “the public sphere” and historical literature on workers’ struggle for
autonomous communication in post-revolutionary China, this paper uses an extended case study to establish a two-pronged analysis that demonstrates the progressively exclusionary and pro-capitalist nature of China’s existing public sphere on the one hand and workers’ appropriation of available technological means for autonomous communicative practice on the other. It points to the potential constitution of Chinese labour as counter-publics in China’s deeply divided class society.


China filters Internet traffic in and out of the country. In order to circumvent the firewall, it is helpful to know where the filtering occurs. In this work, we explore the AS-level topology of China’s network, and probe the firewall to find the locations of filtering devices. We find that even though most filtering occurs in border ASes, choke points also exist in many provincial networks. The result suggests that two major ISPs in China have different approaches placing filtering devices.


Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has revolutionized popular expression in China, enabling users to organize, protest, and influence public opinion in unprecedented ways. Guobin Yang’s pioneering study maps an innovative range of contentious forms and practices linked to Chinese cyberspace, delineating a nuanced and dynamic image of the Chinese Internet as an arena for creativity, community, conflict, and control. Like many other contemporary protest forms in China and the world, Yang argues, Chinese online activism derives its methods and vitality from multiple and intersecting forces, and state efforts to constrain it have only led to more creative acts of subversion. Transnationalism and the tradition of protest in China’s incipient civil society provide cultural and social resources to online activism. Even Internet businesses have encouraged contentious activities, generating an unusual synergy between commerce and activism. Yang’s book weaves these strands together to create a vivid story of immense social change, indicating a new era of informational politics.


This study explains the institutional structure and mechanism of economic regulation in China’s telecommunications basic service industry. The case of telecoms basic service provides an excellent window to explore how Chinese leadership governs strategic state sectors whose assets and profits are central to the national economy. Challenging the ideational model of independent regulator, this study argues that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) explains much of the telecoms business regulation, as the authority of the Ministry of Information Industry has been circumscribed by other party-state institutions. The SASAC’s regulatory power suggests that the primary goal of the Chinese
industrial economy is the best protection of state assets through the creation of large and strong state firms, not the protection of consumers’ interests by breaking up the monopoly in markets.


Although the Chinese state has allowed US-based transnational corporations to play an instrumental role in China’s information technology (IT)-led development strategy, a dominant segment of Chinese political and technological leadership has always been wary of the negative political, economic and cultural implications of continued American domination in digital technological developments. Chinese efforts at asserting greater control over a rapidly evolving networked communication infrastructure have been multifaceted. Significantly, the past few years have seen an escalation of domestic discourses on “network sovereignty” and “indigenous innovations” or the mastery of core technologies at the industrial development strategy and technological policy levels. An elite consensus has crystallized around the mobilization of national resources to catch up with the United States in hardware and software IT developments, particularly to achieve potential leadership in next-generation network technologies. However, China’s quest for technological leadership in the network age continues to be constrained by a range of domestic political economic forces on one hand, and mediated by the paradoxical dynamics of interstate cooperation and rivalry in the political economy of global communication on the other. The growing transnational nature of the capitalist accumulation process, of which China’s deepened global integration through its rapidly expanding and increasingly market-driven information industry has been a critical component, has further complicated these endeavors.


In order to strictly control the free flow of information on the Chinese Internet, Chinese government enact a set of laws and regulations which treat the Internet in the same manner as traditional media and, on some occasions, harsher on the Internet than on the traditional media. The author argues that because of the lack of the watchdog media in China to counterbalance the government power, the Internet has a huge potential to bring about a participatory political culture. As an empowering medium which is still under a lot of developments, the Internet should be guaranteed a freer space for expression.